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Introduction 
 This paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of the degree of success 
enjoyed by bills in state legislatures. More specifically, we propose a model of bill 
success that includes a measure of judicial preferences such that we can ascertain the 
extent to which judicial ideology and perceived judicial climate constrain legislative 
behavior. We argue that liberal bills are less likely to be enacted in states where the court 
of last resort is also liberal as opponents will be concerned that the high court will read 
the legislation too expansively. There is, thus, additional incentive to mobilize to prevent 
passage of liberal bills in these states.  
 While such an inquiry can advance our knowledge about bill success in state 
legislatures, more significantly, this project can inform our thinking about legislative-
judicial interaction. To date, most work examining the relationship between legislatures 
and courts has studied the role courts play in policy-making and the extent to which 
legislatures constrain judicial action. This project considers that it is also conceivable that 
courts constrain legislative action. Our findings indicate some modest support for the 
supposition that judicial ideology does influence the likelihood of a bill being enacted 
into law. This is particularly likely when liberal bills are being considered in states with a 
liberal bench.  
The relationship between state legislatures and state courts of last resort is thus 
more sophisticated and strategic than currently understood in the literature. Courts 
certainly respond to the political context in which disputes are brought. However, a 
complete understanding of legislative-judicial interaction demands that legislative 
behavior relative to courts be studied as well. Some work has examined legislative 
response to judicial decisions but as will be detailed below, this work primarily examines 
the circumstances under which legislatures seek to reverse or modify judicial decisions 
that are counter to legislative objectives. While there is an emerging body of literature 
examining judicial effects on legislatures, that work has emphasized judicial review of 
legislation after its passage (Rogers, 2001). The more strategic approach of preventing 
bill passage so that courts will not have the opportunity to interpret, and perhaps expand, 
legislative meaning has yet to be given any serious attention by scholars. 
Legislative/Judicial Interaction 
In a constitutional democracy where courts have the power of judicial review, the 
balance of power between courts and legislatures is a significant issue. In the American 
experience, it was long assumed that appellate courts, and especially courts of last resort, 
served to protect the rights and interests of minorities against potential abuses resulting 
from popular will. In this formulation, the role of appellate courts is to defend basic 
constitutional liberties from political repression.  
In his seminal article, Robert Dahl (1957) challenged the conventional wisdom 
arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court could not sustain a nonmajoritarian role in the U.S. 
system. He suggested that because justices are recruited from the political arena, they can 
be expected to support the system that recruited them. Exceptions are likely to occur only 
when a new political coalition emerges. Dahl further concludes that the Supreme Court is 
an integral part of the dominant alliance and thus is an important buttress of the existing 
system (Handberg and Hill, 1980). Moreover, judicial legitimacy is dependent upon 
respecting the major policies of those in power in the legislative branch. 
It would not be an overstatement to suggest that Dahl’s thesis captured the 
imagination of many judicial scholars and sparked a debate that continues to the present. 
Adamany (1973) and Casper (1976) provided vigorous critiques of Dahl’s argument. 
Adamany challenges the idea that the Supreme Court merely legitimates the dominant 
coalition; instead he suggests that courts can serve as a destabilizing force as well. In his 
view, the Court does not facilitate governance but prevents the policies of the new 
majority from being implemented. For our purposes, we are examining the extent to 
which judicial ideology discourages the passage or implementation of new policies for 
fear the court will broaden its meaning beyond what opponents of the bill and even 
supporters of modest change can tolerate. Although distinct, this proposition is 
complementary to Adamany’s speculation.  
Casper’s critique centers on the narrow emphasis employed by Dahl in his 
research. Confining inquiry to constitutional issues and the exercise of judicial review 
over legislation skews an understanding of legislative/judicial interaction. Constitutional 
questions do not comprise a majority of the court’s docket; judicial review is not 
exercised often. A more complete understanding of the relationship between these two 
branches requires an examination of statutory interpretation as well. 
In her research detailing congressional responses to statutory interpretations by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, Henschen (1983) found that Congress rarely responds to 
statutory decisions of the high Court. The relative infrequency of response is striking 
perhaps suggesting that Congress regularly acquiesces to the Court and that the two 
branches rarely disagree with one another. Of course, while broadening the relationship 
to include statutory interpretation is worthwhile, the emphasis remains on judicial 
interpretation of legislation and the aftermath of that interpretation.  
More recent examinations of legislative-judicial interaction, while explicitly 
strategic in their focus, still understand legislative behavior primarily in the wake of 
judicial review of legislation. Separation of powers models (hereafter SOP models) are 
increasingly being used to examine the ways in which courts and legislatures at both the 
state and federal levels constrain one another. As Rogers (2001) notes, the Supreme 
Court clearly can influence Congress in terms of vetoing legislative enactments and 
certainly courts have an informational advantage relative to legislatures. As Rogers notes, 
“(c)ourts make an informational contribution to the policy process that legislatures cannot 
easily replicate” (p.87). Legislature must act in a climate of uncertainty as to the ultimate 
consequences of a bill if enacted. Using game theory, Rogers then models strategic 
interactions between the Supreme Court and Congress explicitly noting that this model 
should be generalizable to the state setting. He concludes that the strategic interaction 
between the two branches clearly influences both legislative and judicial behavior. Still, 
his conceptualization of the interaction assumes the passage of legislation and judicial 
review of it. He notes that “what the legislature loses to judicial policy-making, it more 
than makes up from the informational service that the Court provides in helping the 
Legislature to secure its own policy goals” (p.96). We seek to build on this observation 
by examining the likelihood bills will even be passed in varying judicial climates. We are 
primarily interested in the extent to which anticipated judicial rulings given the dominant 
ideology of a given court can shape the legislative agenda. This question has not been 
subjected to systematic scrutiny within the literature to date. 
There is some qualified support in the literature for the argument that judicial 
climate might constrain legislatures. For example, Mansbridge (1986) argues that one 
reason some states were reluctant to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment was because of a 
fear that a liberal U.S. Supreme Court would interpret it more broadly than intended or 
desired by members of those legislatures. Similarly, Stiles (2002) argues that legislation 
expanding the rights of gays and lesbians might have been less likely to be enacted in 
states with liberal courts for fear the legislation would be read broadly by the state court 
of last resort. We seek to test that speculation in a more systematic and comprehensive 
way. 
Models of Bill Success 
Before we can test the hypothesis that judicial ideology can help predict the 
likelihood that a bill will become law, we need to review what we already know to 
influence the success of proposed legislation at the state level. Representational criteria 
have long been thought to matter. For example, in studies of the passage of women’s 
rights legislation, whether a critical mass of women are in the legislature has been argued 
to matter (Thomas, 1994; Saint Germain, 1989). However, other research has indicated 
that the presence of women in the legislature has a negligible impact on the outcome of 
such legislation (e.g. Tolbert and Steuernagel, 2001).  
More generally, the partisan composition of the legislature has long been thought 
to matter as has the degree of professionalization of the state legislature. Certainly, we 
would agree that any examination of legislative success needs to include variables 
internal to the legislature such as degree of professionalization and partisanship. When 
looking at a specific subset of issues, critical mass or strength of the constituency most 
likely to benefit should be studied as well.  
Our argument is not with the inclusion of such variables but with confining the 
scope of such inquiries to the influence of those variables on the internal workings of the 
legislature. We are primarily interested in the legislative-judicial interaction relationship; 
the strategic nature of such interactions might well be shaped by such institutional 
variables. 
And of course, the interaction is undoubtedly influenced by the anticipated 
behavior of judges as well. As Brace, Langer and Hall (2000) note, increasingly political 
scientists are interested in the strategic interaction among political actors and the extent to 
which political elites are responsive to the preferences of other actors. The perceived 
preferences of judges might well then inform legislative behavior. Legislators as strategic 
actors might well not want to have to respond to judicial interpretation in statutes; it 
would be preferable to prevent the enactment of a bill than to have to revisit a bill 
because of how the courts construed it. (See Rogers, 2001 as well for a discussion of 
strategic interactions between judges and legislators.)  
This may be particularly true when the state court of last resort shares an 
ideological leaning with the legislative majority. That is to say, a liberally controlled 
legislature is still held accountable by the conservative minority (depending on the size of 
the minority of course). However, a liberal court may not be constrained and could well 
expand and enhance such legislation being challenged in court. This relationship 
presumably has some merit when applied to conservative legislatures and courts as well. 
Judicial role (i.e. the degree of activism employed by judges in deciding cases) does not 
necessarily correlate with political ideology. Conservative activist judges were as 
plentiful in the 1990s as liberal activist judges were in the 1960s.  
Still, one might expect the strategic actor to be most effective when different 
ideological perspectives prevail in the two branches. We would argue otherwise. When 
control is divided in that way, less discretion is enjoyed by judges. Liberal judges asked 
to interpret conservative legislation have no incentive presumably to construe it broadly. 
Accordingly, we argue that strategic behavior, particularly by those not sympathetic to 
the prevailing judicial ideology, is most apparent as the legislature determines whether to 
enact the legislation. Moreover, judges may well be more liberal or conservative than 
their legislative counterparts. They might well be more insulated from the public as well. 
Thus, it is important to measure judicial preferences in a more sophisticated manner than 
captured by partisan affiliation. We are interested in determining, then, the extent to 
which judicial ideology shapes legislative behavior as the preferences of judges may or 
may not be consistent with prevailing legislative attitudes. A subtle measure of 
preferences will allow for a consideration of differences in degree of ideology whether or 
not partisan affiliation is the same. 
Research Questions 
 The questions, then, driving this paper are as follows:  1) Can legislative-judicial 
interaction add explanatory power to why bills proceed through the legislature?;  2)  Does 
the nature of the bill (e.g. ideological) impact its legislative success as some authors 
suggest (Gamson, 1990; Moen, 1984); and 3) does legislative-judicial interaction apply to 
ideological bills?  If so, does the interaction apply only for liberal bills or are legislatures 
also reluctant to submit conservative bills to a more conservative court?  
Cases/Dataset 
 To test our hypotheses, we employ the State Legislative Dataset
1
compiled 
principally by Reingold and Schneider and aggregated for longitudinal analysis by Stiles 
for the purposes of this paper.  For more information on the State Legislative Dataset, see 
Reingold and Scheneider (2001).  When aggregated, the dataset contains 38,707 cases 
from ten states (Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, New 
Jersey, Nevada, Ohio and Pennsylvania).  The years of collection for the dataset were 
1973, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989 and 1993.  Not all years were collected for all states.  
Therefore, forty-three state years are represented in the dataset.  Additional state-level 
variables were added using a host of data sources to be cited during the discussion on 
operationalization.   
 Bills were included in the dataset if they were introduced by the legislators in the 
sample.  The sample includes all female members of each legislature plus half their male 
colleagues (chosen randomly) and committee-sponsored bills.  Although there is an 
oversampling of female legislators, and therefore possibly more liberal bills (see Thomas, 
1994 and Reingold, 2000 on whether or not women legislators present more liberal bills), 
studies find that women’s votes seldom if ever affect bill passage (Reingold, 2000).  
Further, most studies find that legislation on women’s issues (usually a type of liberal 
legislation) sponsored by women is not more likely to pass than women’s issues 
sponsored by men (Bratton and Haynie (1999), Tolbert and Steuernagel (2001) but see 
Thomas (1994)).  Therefore, evidence regarding our questions of interest regarding 
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determinants of legislative success and legislative-judicial interaction should not be 
affected. 
Operationalization/Measurement 
 The unit of analysis is each bill introduced into a legislature.  Using the bill as the 
unit of analysis allows us to determine whether bill-specific factors such as ideology of 
the bill
2
 contribute to our ability to explain legislative success and possible legislative-
judicial strategic interaction. 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable for all models is the progression of bills in the state 
legislature (table 1).  How far the bill progresses in the state legislature can be seen as a 
measure for how much support the bill has in the state legislature.  Generally, a bill that 
passes both houses in the legislature but is vetoed by the governor, for example, should 
be considered to have more support than a bill that is introduced into a committee of one 
house and proceeds no farther.  Values of the dependent variable range from one (bill 
submitted but never assigned to a committee) to nineteen (passed into law).   
Independent Variables. 
 Independent variables are divided into three subgroups—state political 
institutions, state nonpolitical factors that may nevertheless affect political outcomes (i.e. 
demographic and economic variables) and bill-specific variables. 
State Political Institutions 
 Measures under this category attempt to capture key political factors of the 
legislature, the courts, government as a whole and legislative-judicial interaction.  No 
direct measure exists to measure ideological preferences of the State Supreme Courts.  
However, we employ Brace, Langer and Hall’s (2000) indirect measure (PAJID).  The 
variable ranges from 0-100 and is based in part on the ideology of the state at the time 
that the justice became a member of the state supreme court, in part on the selection 
method of the court (appointment, election, etc.) and in some part on justices’ partisan 
affiliations.   
 We also employ a measure of partisan affiliation of the state supreme court
3
.  This 
measure is dichotomous and coded for one if a majority of the court is composed of 
Democrats and zero otherwise (compiled from The Judicial Bench).  In some states, 
information on justices’ party affiliation was not available.  In cases where it was 
impossible to determine the court’s composition (e.g. Montana and Nevada), the state-
years were dropped from the analysis.  This exclusion may select the dataset in favor of 
states where party is more important (i.e. important enough for more justices to list their 
partisan affiliations.  However, we decided that including the justices’ party affiliation is 
important enough to risk this selection effect.  Thirty-five state-years remain in the 
analysis after partisanship of the Court is included as a variable. 
 We also include two measures specifically for the legislature.  The first is a 
dichotomous measure for whether or not the Republicans have a majority in the 
legislature.  The second is the degree of professionalization in the state legislatures 
(Carey, Niemi and Powell, 2000).  It is possible that more professional legislatures would 
be more decentralized to allow individual members more power and greater re-election 
prospects (e.g. Fiorina, 1977).  If that is true, then greater professionalization might have 
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 Even though the PAJID measure is based partly on partisanship of the justice, the correlation between 
PAJID and party is low (-0.1227) and, therefore, seems to capture different political phenomena (ideology 
is not the same as party across states). 
a negative effect on bill passage because decentralization might make it more difficult for 
bills to pass through all the necessary stages of the legislative process.  It is also possible, 
however, that members of more professional legislatures might require more campaign 
contributions to wage re-election efforts.  If that is true, then professional legislatures 
might be more likely to pass bills to appease the relevant interest groups and assure future 
campaign finance.   
 We also include an interaction variable to measure the strategic effect when the 
legislature has a Republican majority and the Supreme Court has a Democratic majority.  
We hypothesize that, to the extent that partisan maneuvering is the motivating factor for 
any legislative-judicial strategic interaction (instead of ideology), then we would most 
likely see the interaction when the two institutions are controlled by rival parties. 
 We also include two government-wide independent variables.  The first is elite 
ideology (Berry et al, 1998) for the state and years in the dataset.  To the extent that the 
government as a whole is more liberal, we expect less strategic interaction to avoid 
sending bills to a liberal court.  Second, we include a measure of partisan competition 
(Holbrook and VanDunk, 1993).  Traditional studies (such as Schattschneider, 1960) 
suggest that increased partisan competition may make liberal bills more likely to be 
passed because parties are wooing new groups of voters.  However, Mooney and Lee 
(1995) find that for morality legislation, increased partisan competition makes bills less 
likely to be passed. 
NonPolitical Variables 
 We employ some economic variables for the state including unemployment 
levels, amount of welfare expenditures per capita and state revenue.  We include these 
economic variables as controls to examine whether it is economic or political factors (or 
some combination) driving legislative success.  We might expect that in harder economic 
times, legislatures would be more likely to pass more bills in an attempt to offer their 
citizens some relief.  Or in states with greater revenue, we might expect more bill passage 
(to spend the revenue).   
For the models that test ideological bills, we also include the estimated percent of 
blacks in a state in a given year (obtained from the State Politics and Policy Website) and 
females as a percentage of the state workforce (from Reingold and Schneider, 2001).  
Finally, for ideological bills, we also include Elazar’s (1972) measures of state political 
culture.  We would expect states with a more moral political culture (in part a culture  
that stresses public duty to participate in politics partly in order to improve the lives of 
the state’s citizens) to be more likely to pass liberal legislation and states with a 
traditional political culture (that emphasizes elite rule and conservative values) to be least 
likely to do so (Reingold and Schneider, 2001, found support for these hypotheses).  
However, for conservative bills, we would expect the opposite relationship. 
Bill-Specific Factors 
 Finally, a major benefit of having a dataset containing a large number of bills is 
that we can examine what effect bill-specific factors might have on legislative success 
and legislative-judicial strategic interaction.  We employ three bill-specific variables in 
our models.  First, bills have been coded for whether or not they have clearly liberal (e.g. 
expanding the size of government, increasing civil rights, pro-choice or progressive racial 
issues) or conservative (e.g. legislation that supports the notion of the traditional family 
or other socially conservative legislation, legislation that lowers taxes or otherwise 
reduces the scope of government) content.  Two dummy variables measure, respectively, 
whether or not the bill is liberal and whether or not the bill is conservative. 
Second, Reingold and Schneider (2001) find that committee-sponsored bills have 
a higher chance of passage in the legislature.  Therefore, we include a dichotomous 
variable for whether or not a bill was sponsored by a committee to assess its effect on 
legislative success. 
Results  
All Bills 
 The first question we address is whether legislative-judicial interaction can add 
explanatory power to why bills proceed through the legislature.  Our approach, then, is to 
construct a model to explain legislative success and then include judicial and judicial-
legislative interaction variables to attempt to increase explanatory power.   
 We run a time series regression model (random effects) and index on the variable 
state-year to control for panel effects due to time or space (table 2).  The first finding that 
we must point out is that with an R squared of .1764, we are missing much of the 
explanation for why a bill progresses through the legislature.   
 That being said, the findings that we do have are interesting.  First, the findings 
suggest that ideology and not party are driving a possible strategic interaction between 
the legislature and the Supreme Court.  We find that the PAJID measure of Supreme 
Court ideology does have a negative effect on legislative bill progress.  A liberal court 
may be deterring bill passage in general from a presumably more conservative 
legislature
4
.  This finding is consistent with Mansbridge (1986) and Stiles (2002). 
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 If some measure existed comparing ideology across state legislatures, we could test for differences in 
ideology between the legislature and the courts rather than ideology of the court only.   
Second, party effects are also significant in that legislatures with Republican 
majorities have a negative significant effect on bill progress and that Democratically-
controlled courts have a positive effect on bill passage.  However, the interaction variable 
controlling a Republican majority and a Democratic Court, although negative as 
predicted, is not significant.  This finding suggests that Republican legislatures may 
simply be passing fewer bills overall and thus not increasing the size of government.  In 
other words, the Republicans are acting like Republicans regardless of the State Supreme 
Court’s ideological preferences.  As for why a Democratic Court is related to more bills 
being passed, the courts that are Democratically controlled are more likely (and 
correlated at .3206) with Democratically controlled legislatures.  Thus Democratic 
legislatures may also be acting like Democrats again without thought to the Supreme 
Court. 
We also find that more professional state legislatures are more likely to pass 
legislation generally.  This supports the idea that interest groups might be pressuring the 
legislature to pass the bills either by providing them with persuasive information or by 
offering always-needed campaign assistance.  The economic state-level variables and the 
political competition variable, however, are not significant.   
 The bill-specific factors are all significant.  The ideological measures show that 
both liberal and conservative bills are significantly less likely to progress through the 
legislature.  This finding supports findings from authors such as Gamson (1990), Moen 
(1984) and Mooney and Lee (1995) who assert that the government may be more likely 
to pass bills upon which compromise (resulting in more widely distributed benefits) is 
possible.  Finally, similar to Reingold and Schneider (2001), we find that committee 
sponsored bills are significantly more likely to progress in the state legislature.  
Ideological Bills - Liberal 
Our findings show that ideological bills, both liberal and conservative are 
significantly less likely to pass than nonideological ones.  However, we also see evidence 
on all bills (both clearly ideological and other bills) of a strategic interaction based on 
ideology between the Supreme Court and the legislature.  If this finding does reflect a 
strategic interaction, we would expect the effect to be present and probably stronger for 
ideologically liberal bills.  Another related and interesting question is whether the 
strategic interaction only holds for liberal bills or whether the same dynamic works in 
reverse for conservative bills and conservative courts.     
 To address this question, we run a time series regression similar to the last one but 
select only liberal bills (table 3).  As mentioned above, we also include proxies for group 
strength of those groups likely to be positively affected by liberal bills.  We use the 
estimated percent of blacks in the state and the percent of the labor force that is female 
and expect these measures to be positive predictors of bill progress.  We also include 
Elazar’s (1972) categories for group political culture
5
. 
Again, the R squared is a bit low (.2105) but again we have some interesting 
findings.  First, we find that more liberal bills progress farther when the government is 
more liberal.  However, controlling for that, we also see that as the state supreme court 
becomes more liberal, legislatures are less likely to send them liberal bills to interpret.  
This finding also suggests that, similar to the findings of Mansbridge (1986) and Stiles 
(2002), more liberal state supreme courts may make legislatures reluctant to send them 
laws (in this case liberal laws) to interpret.   Further, we see that the effect of this 
independent variable on legislative progress is stronger for liberal bills than for all bills.  
 In this model, none of the party variables are significant with respect to bill 
progress. This finding also supports the idea that the strategic interaction is ideologically 
motivated rather than party motivated. 
 Liberal bills in more professional legislatures were significantly more likely to 
progress through the legislature.  Earlier it was suggested that professional legislatures 
might be more susceptible to group pressures than nonprofessional ones.  Including the 
proxies for interests allows us to test whether the strategic interaction might be motivated 
by group concerns rather than ideology.  Percent of the labor force that is female, 
however, does not affect liberal bills’ progress in the legislature.  Surprisingly, estimated 
black percent in the state is actually negatively correlated with liberal bill passage
6
.  
Therefore, neither of these measures supports the idea that group strength rather than 
ideology is driving the interaction effect.  However, better measures of various interest 
groups at the state level would greatly enhance our ability to examine this question.   
Both of Elazar’s political control variables were significant in a negative 
direction.  Our expectation was that progress of bills would be greater in morality states 
and less in traditional states.  However, it appears that in individualistic states (the 
excluded category), political progress of liberal political bills is actually greater.  The 
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 We would rather have used Barry’s citizen ideology measure since it varies by year but this measure is so 
highly correlated with Brace, Langer and Hall’s (2000) PAJID measure (.8219) that we could not use it for 
fear of multicollinearity. 
6
 This finding is a bit of a puzzle which could represent either intergroup competition between women and 
blacks (see Costain, 1990) or could be because black population strength is located in states (such as those 
in the South) where women’s economic strength may be low. 
political competition measure (Holbrook and VanDunk) was excluded from the analysis 
because it was highly correlated (.8) with Elazar’s traditional states measure.   None of 
the economic variables were significant.  Finally, similar to the findings of Reingold and 
Schneider (2001), committee sponsored bills were more successful in the legislature than 
bills sponsored by others.      
Ideological Bills—Conservative 
 From a purely strategic point of view, one might expect the legislative-judicial 
dynamic that appears to exist with respect to liberal bills and with respect to bills 
generally, also to apply to conservative bills but in reverse.  If a legislature is reluctant to 
send liberal bills to a liberal supreme court, then perhaps a legislature would also be 
reluctant to send conservative bills to a more conservative court.  Or conceivably one 
could find that legislatures are also less likely to pass conservative bills and thus to 
subject them to scrutiny by a more liberal state supreme court.  In that case, the ideology 
explanation would be undermined and it might be that separation of powers issues could 
be driving the results.  To the extent that a more liberal state supreme court is more 
activist (which is not necessarily the case), legislatures could be reluctant to subject their 
bills to a supreme court that is more likely to use them for activist purposes. 
 To test this idea, we apply a now familiar model of bill progress and legislative-
judicial interaction to conservative bills.  The results are presented in table 4.  We 
dropped the women’s and African-American group strength proxies that we had used for 
liberal bills and added a measure for the percentage of Christian Right adherents in a state 
(Glenmary Research Center as compiled by Schneider (2000)).  However, the measure 
was too highly correlated (.8) with Elazar’s traditional state measure and had to be 
dropped.   
 This model does not work as well with conservative bills (R squared=.1541). The 
PAJID measure is not significant for conservative bills.  Therefore, the dynamic does not 
seem to be based on strategy with respect to ideology.  Although we do find the 
relationship exists for bills in general, in this paper it has always been the more liberal 
courts having a negative significant effect on bills and liberal bills but not conservative 
bills.  Therefore, the legislature does not seem to be constrained in sending conservative 
bills to a conservative court or to a more liberal court. 
Two other variables were significant in this model.  Professional legislatures in 
this model, as in all the other models, has a significant and positive effect on bill passage.  
Professional legislatures seem to be adept at moving along greater numbers of bills of all 
sorts.  This finding deserves more study and also highlights the need for better state-wide 
measures of interest groups to test whether interest groups are able to better pressure 
professional legislatures for bill progress.  Finally, committee sponsored bills, in this 
model and in the other models, are also significantly more likely to progress in the 
legislature. 
Discussion and Directions for Future Research 
 This paper shows evidence in favor of a strategic interaction between legislatures 
and courts.  Bills and especially liberal bills are less likely to progress in those states 
where the state supreme court has more liberal preferences.  It appears that the interaction 
has to do with ideology rather than party because the findings for ideology are stronger 
and more consistent than those for party.  However, if a measure comparing legislative 
ideology across states and ideally across years were available, then that measure could be 
used to better test these hypotheses.  Also, interaction terms could be created to test the 
effects of differing ideologies of the legislature and the courts. 
 This paper also crudely tested the possibility that group pressures (i.e. women’s 
and African-American strength in different states for liberal bills) were responsible for 
bill progression rather than ideology.  However, the liberal bills model showed no 
positive effect of groups on bill progression.  Still, more valid measures of interest group 
strength across time and across states for various groups could greatly enhance this paper 
and the important questions that it addresses.  If these improved legislative ideology and 
interest group strength measures were available, then future models could be better 
specified and the complex relationships between ideology, party and interest groups 
could be more clearly understood.   
 The specification and predictive power of these models may also be improved by 
paying more attention to the committee assignments of bills.  Our findings show that 
committee-sponsored bills are more likely to be successful than other bills.  Perhaps 
committees determine the progress of bills in other ways in the legislative process that 
could be included in this model.   
Finally, more work should be done on the strategic interaction between the 
legislature and the supreme courts.  Perhaps the interaction could be studied across some 
issue areas where it would be easier to isolate active interest groups.  Future work could 
also incorporate not only interest groups and parties, but the role of the governor in bill 
progress as well.   
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adamany, David. 1973. “Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court.” 
1973 Wisconsin Law Review 790. 
 
Berry, William D., Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, Russell L. Hanson. 1998.  
“Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93.” 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 327-348.  
 
Brace, Paul, Laura Langer and Melinda Gann Hall.  "Measuring the Preferences of State 
Supreme Court Judges."  Journal of Politics v. 62(2).  May 2000. 
 
Bratton, Kathleen A., and Kerry L. Haynie. 1999. “Agenda Setting and Legislative 
Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race.”   Journal of Politics 
61(3): 658-79. 
 
Carey, John M., Richard G. Niemi and Linda W. Powell.  2000.  Term Limits in the State 
Legislatures. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
Casper, Jonathan D. 1976. “The Supreme Court and National Policy Making.” 70 
American Political Science Review 50. 
 
Dahl, Robert. 1957. “Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy Maker.” 6 Journal of Public Law 279. 
 
Elazar, Daniel J. 1972.  American Federalism: A View from the States, 2
nd
 Edition.  New 
York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 
 
Fiorina, Morris P.  1977. Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. New 
Haven:  Yale University Press. 
 
Gamson, William. 1990. The Strategy of Political Protest. Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey 
Press. 
 
Glenmary Research Center. 1990.  Religious Congregations Membership Study. 
http://www.glenmary.org/grc/grc_RCMS2000.htm.  Nashville TN. 
 
Handberg, Roger and Harold F. Hill, Jr. 1980. “Court Curbing, Court Reversals, and 
Judicial Review: The Supreme Court Versus Congress.” Law and Society Review 14(2):  
 
Henschen, Beth. 1983. “Statutory Interpretations of the Supreme Court: Congressional 
Response.” American Politics Quarterly 11(4): 441-458. 
 
Holbrook, Thomas M. and Emily Van Dunk. 1993.  “Electoral Competition in the 
American States.”  American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 4 pp. 995-962. 
 
Mansbridge, Jane. 1986. Why We Lost the ERA. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Moen, Matthew C.  1984.  “School Prayer and the Politics of Life-Style Concern.”  
Social Science Quarterly 65: 1070-81. 
 
Mooney, Christopher Z. and Mei-Hsien Lee.  1995.  “Legislating Morality in the 
American States:  The Case of Pre-Roe Abortion Regulation Reform.”  American Journal 
of Political Science, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 599-627. 
 
Reincke, Mary and Jeaneen C. Wilhelmi.  1965-1993.  The American Bench: Judges of 
the Nation. Minneapolis: Reginald Bishop Forster & Associates.  
 
Reingold, Beth. 2000.  Representing Women: Sex, Gender, and Legislative Behavior in 
Arizona and California. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Reingold, Beth and Paige Schneider. 2001. “Sex, Gender, and the Status of ‘Women’s 
Issue’ Legislation in the States.” Paper presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, San Francisco. 
 
Rogers, James R. 2001. “Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of 
Legislative-Judicial Interaction.” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 1, 
pp. 84-99. 
 
Saint Germain, Michelle. 1989. "A View of Their Own: Women's Committee  
Leadership Styles and State Legislatures." Policy Studies Journal 25(4):  
585-600 
 
Schattschneider, E.E.  1960.  The Semi-Sovereign People. New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston. 
 
Schneider, Paige.  2000. "The Impact of the Christian Right Social Movement on 
Republican Party Development in the South." Unpublished Dissertation.  Atlanta: Emory 
University. 
 
State Politics & Policy Quarterly Data Resource. http://www.unl.edu/sppq 
 
Tolbert, Caroline J., and Gertrude A. Steuernagel. 2001. “Women Lawmakers, State 
Mandates and Women’s Health.” Women & Politics 22(2): 1-39. 
 
Stiles, Elizabeth A. 2002.  Towards Explaining Outcomes:  Social Movement-Legislative 
Interaction at the State Level.  Unpublished Dissertation.  Atlanta: Emory University. 
 
Thomas, Sue. 1994.  How Women Legislate.  New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
APPENDIX A 
From Coding Instructions for Bill Ideology 
State Legislative Data Project 
 
Liberal/Conservative 
The purpose of this variable is to determine if the content of the bill being coded has 
some readily identifiable ideological orientation.  Often the ideological orientation of the 
bill may be ambiguous.  In a sense, we are trying to determine, given the bill’s content, if 
the bill’s sponsor is offering the bill to advance a particular political agenda that could e 
characterized as liberal or conservative.   
 
“Liberal” political policies or agendas are those generally favoring: 
a) an increased role for government in the regulation of business and the 
economy; furthering measures that protect consumers, workers or the 
environment. 
b) Increased spending for health, education, and welfare programs, such as state 
funded pre-K classes, drug rehabilitation programs, or child abuse prevention 
programs. 
c) Policies that expand or strengthen civil rights and liberties for individuals in 
areas such as abortion, women’s rights, gay rights, affirmative action, and the 
rights of the criminally accused. 
d) Anti-death penalty legislation 
 
“Conservative” political policies emphasize individual responsibility over government 
provision of services, and limiting the regulatory power of the government over 
commerce and industry.  Conservatives may generally favor the power of the state as a 
means of social control, upholding traditional social values and traditional conceptions of 
morality.  And, conservatives often adopt a narrow interpretation of individual civil rights 
an liberties.  Therefore, conservative bills often seek to: 
a) eliminate or reduce spending for health, education, and social welfare 
services. 
b) support educational reforms that shift power from the federal and state level to 
the local level, or benefit private schools (e.g. school vouchers) 
c) support traditional social values (anti-abortion, anti-birth control, anti-
government funded day care, anti-gay rights, pro school-prayer) 
d) oppose measures that attempt to achieve “equality or results” rather than 
“equality of opportunity” in educational and work related matters 
e) take a hard line on the rights of the criminally accused and support police 
power over individual civil liberties in criminal procedural matters (e.g. search 
and seizure) 
f) pro-death penalty legislation 
g) privatize government programs and services 
 
Table 1:  Bill Disposition (Dependent Variable) 
 
1 Never Read in Original House  
 
2 Died in Committee, Original House  
 
3 Out of Committee but no Vote in Original House  
 
4 Died in Original House During Vote  
 
5 Never Read in Second House 
 
6 Died in Committee, Second House 
 
7 Out of Committee, but no Vote in Second House 
 
8 Died in Second House During Vote 
 
9 Held in Second House After Vote 
 
10 Held, Died in Conference Committee 
 
11 Awaiting Approval of Conference Vote 
 
12 Original House Never Approves Second Version 
 
13 Died in Second House, Conference Report ever Accepted 
 
14 Died in Final Vote of Original House 
 
15 Held Over Until Next Session 
 
16 Became Amendment to Other Bill 
 
17 Died by Governor Vote 
 
18 Partially Succeeded/Failed (Line-Item Veto) 
 
19 Passed/Signed into Law/Adopted 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Model of Bill Progress and Legislative-Judicial Interaction in State 
Legislatures 
 
 
Variable Coeff(Std. Err.) 
Political Institution Variables  
Supreme Court Ideology  -.062(.037)* 
Democratic Majority on Court  3.408(1,823)* 
Professionalism of Legislature    .518(.042) 
Republican Majority in Legislature -2.549(1.434)* 
Legislature and Court Majority from 
Opposite Parties 
-1.014(2.486) 
Elite (Government) Ideology   -.013(.027) 
Partisan Competition     .022(.037) 
  
Nonpolitical (Economic & Demographic)  
Unemployment Rate     .021(.265) 
Welfare Expenditures   -.069(.076) 
State Revenue     .0009(.0008) 
  
Bill-Specific Variables  
Liberal Bill -1.176(.155)*** 
Conservative Bill -1.794(.306)*** 
Committee Sponsored Bill   4.558(.151)*** 
  
Constant 10.562(3.853)** 
  
 
N=17033 
Wald Chi2=1103.63 
Prob<.0000 
Rsqd=.1764 
Rho=.049 
 
*signif <= .05 
**signif<=.01 
***signif<=.001 
all tests one-tailed 
 
Table 3:  Model of Bill Progress and Legislative-Judicial Interaction in State 
Legislatures for Liberal Bills 
 
 
Variable Coeff(Std. Err.) 
Political Institution Variables  
Supreme Court Ideology   -.447(.139)*** 
Democratic Majority on Court -1.287(3.039) 
Professionalism of Legislature     .601(.226)** 
Republican Majority in Legislature -3.397(2.967) 
Legislature and Court Majority from 
Opposite Parties 
  2.935(4.804) 
Elite (Government) Ideology   1.504(.881)* 
  
Nonpolitical (Economic & Demographic)  
Unemployment Rate   -.894(.589 
Welfare Expenditures   -.104(.149) 
Morality Political Culture -25.773(11.267)** 
Traditional Political Culture -11.656(7.091)* 
Percent African-American Population   -.436(.123)*** 
% Females in Work Force      .200(.182) 
  
Bill-Specific Variables  
Committee Sponsored Bill   4.219(.515)*** 
  
Constant 18.932(9.392)* 
 
N=1740 
Wald Chi2=142.17 
P<.0000 
Rsqd=.2105 
 
*signif <= .05 
**signif<=.01 
***signif<=.001 
all tests one-tailed 
Table 4:  Model of Bill Progress and Legislative-Judicial Interaction in State 
Legislatures for Conservative Bills 
 
Variable Coeff(Std. Err.) 
Political Institution Variables  
Supreme Court Ideology     -.156(.129) 
Democratic Majority on Court   -3.579(3.312) 
Professionalism of Legislature      .392(.222)* 
Republican Majority in Legislature   -3.185(2.459) 
Legislature and Court Majority from 
Opposite Parties 
   5.414(4.777) 
Elite (Government) Ideology     -.042(.048) 
  
Nonpolitical (Economic & Demographic)  
Unemployment Rate     -.711(.432)* 
Welfare Expenditures     -.157(.169) 
Morality Political Culture -13.532(10.848) 
Traditional Political Culture   -4.285(7.406) 
  
Bill-Specific Variables  
Committee Sponsored Bill    2.715(.909)** 
  
Constant 18.853(9.114)* 
 
N=541 
Wald Chi2=42.50 
P<.0000 
Rsqd= .1541 
 
*signif <= .05 
**signif<=.01 
***signif<=.001 
all tests one-tailed 
 
 
